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Abstract—Cybersecurity attacks in Cloud data centres are
increasing alongside the growth of the Cloud services market.
Existing research proposes a number of anomaly detection
systems for detecting such attacks. However, these systems en-
counter a number of challenges, specifically due to the unknown
behaviour of the attacks and the occurrence of genuine Cloud
workload spikes, which must be distinguished from attacks. In
this paper, we discuss these challenges and investigate the issues
with the existing Cloud anomaly detection approaches. Then,
we propose a Real-time Anomaly Detection System (RADS)
for Cloud data centres, which uses a one class classification
algorithm and a window-based time series analysis to address
the challenges. Specifically, RADS can detect VM-level anomalies
occurring due to DDoS and cryptomining attacks. We evaluate
the performance of RADS by running lab-based experiments and
by using real-world Cloud workload traces. Evaluation results
demonstrate that RADS can achieve 90-95% accuracy with a
low false positive rate of 0-3%. The results further reveal that
RADS experiences fewer false positives when using its window-
based time series analysis in comparison to using state-of-the-art
average or entropy based analysis.
Index Terms—Cloud, Anomaly Detection, Cybersecurity At-
tack, One Class Classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing services are becoming ever more popular.
According to a report1 from Gartner, Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS) has seen growth of more than 40% in revenue
every year since 2011. They also predict growth of more than
25% every year through 2019 for IaaS. Such a growth in
the Cloud services market has attracted various cybersecurity
attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the Cloud in order to gain
personal benefit. Amongst the various cybersecurity attacks
in the Cloud, DDoS and cryptomining attacks are growing
sharply. In the Cloud, DDoS attacks typically attempt to
overwhelm the Virtual Machine (VM) network by sending
large amount of network packets from multiple hosts, so
that the VM cannot serve its legitimate users’ requests for
various services such as web application, media streaming
application, etc. Whereas, cryptomining attacks gain remote
access to the VM in order to use its CPU computing power
to perform cryptocurrency mining, which in turn interrupts
legitimate users’ computation on the VM. According to a
report2 from Cisco, DDoS attacks with size greater than 1
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Gbps increased by 172% in 2016 (1.3 million attacks in
2016) and they predict that the attacks will increase to 3.1
million by 2021. Most recently, on February 28, 2018 the
Github website was hit by the largest-ever DDoS attack3 (1.35
Tbps). Due to the rising value of cryptocurrency, cryptomining
attacks increased six-fold during the period January-August
2017, as reported in Infosecurity magazine4. Most importantly,
Cloud environments are very much vulnerable to cryptomining
attacks due to the auto-scaling nature of the Cloud which
allows the attackers to automatically spawn more VMs, i.e.
more CPUs for the cryptomining task. This is evident from
the recently identified cryptomining attack5 on electric vehicle
maker Tesla’s Cloud environment.
To successfully deny legitimate users access to the Cloud
services and to perform cryptocurrency mining, both DDoS
and cryptomining attacks significantly consume the network
and the CPU of the Cloud VMs, respectively. This results
in significant deviation in the normal network and CPU
usage pattern of the VMs, which can be defined as VM-
level anomaly. Hence, anomaly detection techniques can be
used to identify DDoS and the cryptomining attacks in the
Cloud. Researchers have proposed various anomaly detection
techniques for Cloud which use machine learning or statistical
approaches. The anomaly detection systems proposed in [1],
[2], [3] use supervised machine learning algorithms. These
algorithms require both the “normal” and the “anomalous”
behaviour traces to build the learning models, which can detect
the anomalies. The algorithms may fail to detect anomalies
arising due to unknown DDoS or cryptomining attacks, traces
of which are not recorded by the learning models or which
have very different patterns from the learned “anomalous”
patterns. To solve this problem researchers in [4], [5], [6] have
proposed unsupervised learning and one class classification
algorithms such as K-Means, Self Organising Map (SOM), and
one class Support Vector Machine (SVM). These algorithms
build the learning models by using the “normal” behaviour
traces. The models can identify anomalies by observing the
deviation in the “normal” behaviour pattern and as a result,
these algorithms can successfully detect zero-day or unknown
attacks. Although the unsupervised learning and one class
classification algorithms improve the accuracy of anomaly
detection along with the ability to detect zero-day attacks,
these algorithms may exhibit false positives arising due to
3https://thehackernews.com/2018/03/biggest-ddos-attack-github.html
4https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/ibm-cryptomining-attacks-
increased/
5https://www.coindesk.com/tesla-public-cloud-was-briefly-hijacked-by-
crypto-miners/
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2workload spikes in a Cloud data centre. We can consider these
spikes as genuine workload spikes which do not follow the
“normal” workload trend and their values are significantly
higher than the other values in the workload data set. It is
important to note that the genuine workload spikes persist only
for a momentary period of time and this differentiates them
from the anomalies (high utilisation values) due to DDoS and
cryptomining attacks, which persist for a relatively long period
of time.
In order to understand whether the VMs hosted in a real-
world Cloud data centre experience workload spikes, we
analysed real-world Cloud workload traces [7] collected from
a Cloud data centre named Bitbrains6. The traces contain seven
performance metrics including CPU utilisation and network
throughput of 1,750 VMs. We performed a spike detection
analysis by using the Interquartile Range (IQR7) algorithm.
From the analysis of one month of the trace data from [7], we
observe that 84% of VMs show spikes in their CPU utilisation
at least once in the experimental month, whereas 95% of
VMs show spikes in their network traffic at least once in
the same time period. From this finding we can anticipate
that an anomaly detection system deployed in a large-scale
Cloud data centre may generate frequent false positives due
to the workload spikes. Receiving false positive alarms on a
frequent basis is a major demerit of anomaly detection systems
designed for the Cloud for a number of reasons: waste of
operators’ time as they engage in unnecessary investigations
of the falsely raised alarms, unwanted interruption of users’
applications while the operator tries to mitigate the anomaly
without realising that the alarm is false, etc. This motivates a
solution to remove false positives from the anomaly detection
systems designed for the Cloud. Researchers in [4], [5], [6]
consider window-based averaging on the raw data to reduce
false positives. The works in [8] and [9] consider entropy-
based anomaly detection which also reduces the number of
false positives. However, these approaches may still generate
false positives in certain scenarios for certain use cases, which
we explain in the next section.
In this paper, we propose a Real-time Anomaly Detection
System (RADS) for Cloud data centres, which can detect
VM-level anomalies occurring due to unknown DDoS and
cryptomining attacks. RADS uses a One Class Classification
(OCC) [10] based algorithm that learns the “normal” pattern
of CPU and network usage of each of the hosted VMs. The
algorithm flags an anomaly whenever a VM’s CPU or network
usage pattern deviates significantly from its “normal” pattern.
To deal with the false positives, RADS combines average
and standard deviation of the raw data in a window-based
time series analysis. Specifically, we make the following key
contributions in this paper:
(1) We propose RADS for Cloud data centres which achieves
high accuracy and low false positive rate in detecting
VM-level anomalies occurring due to unknown DDoS
and cryptomining attacks. RADS can operate in real-time,
meaning that it can monitor each VM hosted in the Cloud
6https://www.solvinity.com
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interquartile range
data centre in real-time and detect the attacks as they
appear inside the VMs.
(2) We propose a novel training optimisation algorithm that
decides the optimal amount of training data to be used
for building the VM-specific classification models. This
helps in achieving real-time dynamic training for RADS
as opposed to offline static training which uses a fixed
amount of training data. This is important considering the
fact that in a Cloud data centre, the VMs host diverse
workloads and a fixed amount of training data for all
the VM-specific classification models may result in poor
performance for RADS.
(3) We evaluate the performance of RADS by running lab-
based experiments in an OpenStack8 based Cloud data
centre. We emulate the DDoS and the cryptomining
attacks by running microbenchmarks. Evaluation results
show that RADS can detect VM-level anomalies with an
accuracy of 90-95% and a low false positive rate of 0-3%.
The results further reveal on average 34% improvement
in accuracy and 60% improvement in false positive rate
when RADS uses its window-based time series analysis
instead of using the state-of-the-art average [4], [5], [6] or
entropy [8], [9] based analysis.
(4) We further validate the performance of RADS in terms of
false positive rate by analysing real-world Cloud workload
traces [7] collected from a Cloud data centre named
Bitbrains. The analysis results demonstrate that RADS
experiences fewer false positives when using its window-
based time series analysis in comparison to using aver-
age [4], [5], [6] or entropy [8], [9] based analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II defines the problems with the existing approaches
in Cloud anomaly detection. Section III demonstrates RADS
window-based time series analysis. Section IV and V give
an overview of RADS and discuss the RADS framework in
detail, respectively. Section VI presents experimental results
and discusses them. Section VII presents related work in
Cloud anomaly detection which use different types of machine
learning algorithms. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In order to detect cybersecurity attacks in a Cloud data cen-
tre, anomaly detection systems generally make the following
assumptions:
• Assumption-1: Resource utilisation of a VM follows
some kind of “normal behaviour or trend which can
be modelled by using machine learning or statistical
approaches.
• Assumption-2: Cybersecurity attacks such as DDoS and
crytomining attacks consume VM resources significantly.
This results in a deviation in the “normal trend of a VM’s
resource utilisation, which can be captured as anomalous
by the machine learning or statistical approaches.
Assumption-1 is very general and is considered by many
anomaly detection systems like [4], [5], [6], [8]. Assumption-
2 is experimentally demonstrated by [11] while they analysed
8https://www.openstack.org
3real DDoS attack samples taken from the CAIDA9 dataset.
Recently, Radiflow10, a cybersecurity solution provider, has
discovered the first documented cryptomining attack on a
SCADA network. According to Radiflow, cryptomining at-
tacks cause high CPU and network bandwidth consumption.
In our work, we also consider both these assumptions.
In most cases, the Cloud anomaly detection systems perform
well under these assumptions. However, there are some cases
where they may suffer from performance issues. In this paper
we specifically consider the case where a Cloud anomaly
detection system is using a linear classifier like K-Means,
SVM, Naive Bayes, etc., and the VMs are exhibiting workload
spikes. We explain this in the following example.
Example Scenario: We created an example scenario where a
VM hosted in a Cloud data centre runs a Cloud application and
at one stage the VM becomes compromised by a cryptomining
attack that consumes its CPU to perform illicit cyrptocurrency
mining. We built the Cloud data centre in our lab using
OpenStack11 (details of the set-up are available in Section VI)
and executed a Graph Analytics workload (collected from
CloudSuite12) as the Cloud application in one of the VMs
hosted in our data centre. We emulated the cryptomining attack
by running a CPU stress tool that consumes almost 100%
CPU of the VM. This emulation closely relates to real-world
cryptomining attacks where the CPUs are consumed signifi-
cantly to perform the mining. Considering this scenario, we
performed 10 minutes of experiment to analyse the VM’s CPU
utilisation under different situations. We split the experimental
period into two - (i) normal-period: first 5 minutes, without
any attack and (ii) anomaly-period: last 5 minutes, under
cryptomining attack. Furthermore, we injected some artificial
workload spikes during the 3rd minute by running the CPU
stress tool for instantaneous periods of time consecutively.
Figure 1 presents the time series graph of the CPU utilisation
collected every 5 seconds.
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Fig. 1: Time series of CPU utilisation while running the Graph
Analytics application. Pink coloured sections represent the utilisation
during the anomaly-period and green coloured section represents the
utilisation with workload spikes during the normal-period
Window-based Time Series Analysis: Anomaly detection
systems which use linear classifiers, generally perform
9http://www.caida.org/data/passive/ddos-20070804 dataset.xml
10https://radiflow.com
11https://www.openstack.org
12http://cloudsuite.ch
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Fig. 2: Average, standard deviation, and entropy of CPU utilisation
window-based time series analysis where the raw time series
data are firstly distributed into a number of data bins with equal
window size, and secondly, the average or entropy of the data
is calculated in each bin. These averages or entropies collected
from the bins form the time series data to be used in the
anomaly detection systems. To perform such an analysis, we
grouped the CPU utilisation data points into 10 data bins, each
with a window size of 1 minute (the grey coloured partitions of
the time series in Figure 1) and then calculated three statistical
measurements (average, standard deviation, and entropy) of the
CPU utilisation in each bin. We selected the window size to
be 1 minute as we experimentally found that anything shorter
than this does not help in reducing the noise from the CPU
utilisation and anything longer than this does not capture the
short-term CPU utilisation behaviour.
For a discrete random variable X with possible values{
x1,x2...,xn
}
the entropy [12] is calculated using Equa-
tion 1. To prepare the data for the entropy calculation in
each bin, we firstly normalise each of the raw data sam-
ples using Equation 2 (normalised values are in the range
[0.0− 1.0]) and secondly, we decide to which amongst the
following 10 smaller bins each normalised value belongs:
[0.0−0.1), [0.1−0.2), [0.2−0.3), [0.3−0.4), [0.4−0.5), [0.5−
0.6), [0.6− 0.7), [0.7− 0.8), [0.8− 0.9), [0.9− 1.0]. Finally, in
each bin, we count the number of occurrences of the nor-
malised values of the raw data samples in each smaller bin.
Thus, in Equation 1 we consider these numbers of occurrences
as the values of the random variable X in order to calculate
the entropy.
We had 10 values (1 from each data bin) for each statis-
tical measurement, which we present in Figure 2 using 10
coloured dots along the x-axis. The 4 blue dots represent the
measurements during the normal-period, whereas the 5 red
dots represent the measurements during the anomaly-period.
The green dot represents a measurement during the normal-
period, when the CPU encountered consecutive workload
spikes (refers to the 3rd minute in Figure 1).
4H(X) =−
n
∑
i=1
P(xi) logP(xi) (1)
where P(xi) = probability mass function of xi
−logP(xi) = surprisal or self-information of xi
Xnormalised =
X−Xmin
Xmax−Xmin (2)
where Xnormalised = normalised metric value
X = current metric value
Xmin = minimum metric value in the raw data set
Xmax = maximum metric value in the raw data set
In the case of linear classifiers, the “normal” data points
are separated from the “anomalous” data points by a hy-
perplane. In this analysis, we consider that the anomalies
(red dots) and the genuine workload spikes (green dot) are
appearing only during the testing or detection phase of the
classifier. Therefore, for each statistical measurement, we drew
two hyperplanes (the red lines) by considering the minimum
and the maximum values of the “normal” data points (blue
dots); Figure 2 presents this. We expected that the green
dot (workload spikes) resides within the hyperplanes as they
belong to the normal-period and the red dots (anomalies)
are clearly separable by the hyperplanes as they belong to
the anomaly-period of the experiment. From the figure we
observe that, in the case of average, the blue dots are closely
clustered and the red dots are clearly separable from them
by the right hyperplane. However, the green dot representing
the genuine workload spikes does not reside within the hy-
perplanes and indicates an anomaly. In the case of standard
deviation, although the blue dots are clustered together, the
blue and the red dots are marginally separable by the left
hyperplane, and importantly, the green dot does not reside
within the hyperplanes and moves very far from both the
blue and the red dots. In the case of entropy, the blue and
the red dots are not separable, although the green dot resides
within the hyperplanes. From these observations we identify
the following problems for Cloud anomaly detection systems:
(1) An average based linear classifier may identify the genuine
workload spikes as anomalies and raise false positives.
(2) Similar to average, a standard deviation based linear
classifier may also raise false positives. Additionally, it
may even fail to differentiate between normal behaviour
and anomalies, which may raise false negatives resulting
in low classification accuracy.
(3) An entropy based linear classifier may not raise false pos-
itives; but, similar to standard deviation, it may result in
low classification accuracy due to failure in differentiating
between normal behaviour and anomalies.
III. RADS WINDOW-BASED TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
In this section we explain RADS window-based time series
analysis that resolves the problems identified in the previous
section. Specifically, RADS combines average and standard
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Fig. 3: RADS approach: combining average and standard deviation
deviation of the raw data in each time series window; and
uses artificial data points that represent workload spikes.
If we combine the average and standard deviation values
generated from the experiment as discussed in the previous
section, then we can represent them in a two-dimensional
space as shown in Figure 3. Similar to the previous section,
blue, red, and green dots refer to the measurements during the
normal, anomalous, and spike situations, respectively. From
the figure we observe that the coloured dots can be classified
into three classes if we draw the dotted red hyperplanes (hori-
zontal and vertical) based on the maximum average on x-axis
and maximum standard deviation (SD) on y-axis. Hence, this
becomes a three class classification problem, where the classes
can be labeled as: “normal” (blue coloured section) containing
blue dots, “anomaly” (pink coloured section) containing red
dots, and “spike” (green coloured section) containing green
dot. However, we do not wish to go in that direction of
classification as we assume that the samples for the “anomaly”
class as well for the “spike” class are not available or known.
RADS represents the green dot (“spike” class) with an
artificial data point (black dot) which is a vector of the form:
(max avg, max SD), where the max avg and the max SD are
the maximum average and standard deviation of the blue dots
(“normal” class), respectively. This representation is based on
the following assumptions:
• Assumption-3: Workload spikes exhibit average and
standard deviation values higher than the maximum aver-
age and standard deviation values exhibited by “normal”
behaviour, respectively. That means that in Figure 3, the
assumption is that the green dot will never reside in the
pink coloured section.
• Assumption-4: Anomalies exhibit standard deviation val-
ues lower than the maximum standard deviation value
exhibited by “normal” behaviour. That means that in
Figure 3, the assumption is that the red dots will never
reside in the green coloured section.
We define the workload spikes as high utilisation values
which persist only for a momentary period of time. Hence, in
a time series window, the spikes will generate a high average
5value with a high standard deviation value and this will support
Assumption-3. We can support Assumption-4 with the fact that
due to the nature of their attack, both DDoS and cryptomining
attacks consume the resources significantly in a consistent
manner without interrupt, whereas, resource consumption in
a “normal” behaviour is expected to have inconsistency and
interruption.
Thus, using the artificial data point RADS converts the
three class classification problem into a two class classification
problem where the classes are now: (i) “positive”, which
is composed of known “normal” (blue dots) and unknown
“spike” (black dot) samples and (ii) “negative”, which is
composed of unknown “anomaly” (red dots) samples. In
Figure 3 we can see that the two classes are clearly separable
by a solid red hyperplane. Hence, a linear classifier can
successfully differentiate between the two classes and produce
high accuracy with low false positives.
Similar to the CPU utilisation pattern deviation due to
cryptomining attack, network traffic pattern deviates signifi-
cantly due to DDoS attack. This is observed in [11] where
they analysed DDoS attack samples taken from the CAIDA13
dataset. Therefore, RADS analyses network traffic behaviour
in the exactly the same manner as CPU utilisation behaviour
analysis (discussed in this section) in order to detect VM-level
anomalies occurring due to DDoS attack.
VMs may host varieties of applications in a Cloud data
centre, some of which may be CPU intensive, some may be
network intensive, and some may be both CPU and network
intensive. Analysing both the CPU and network behaviour
together makes the raw data points two dimensional, where in
many cases one of the two parameters of the data points may
generate steady time series data without any variance. In such
cases, classification algorithms may suffer from the curse of
dimensionality. We experimentally found this happening while
executing two different Cloud applications (one CPU intensive
and another network intensive) in our testbed. Therefore,
RADS analyses the CPU and the network behaviour separately
although it can perform both in parallel if required.
IV. RADS OVERVIEW
In this section we discuss how RADS builds a linear classi-
fication model that differentiates between the “positive” and
the “negative” classes as defined in the previous section, and
we explain how RADS performs its real-time training and
anomaly detection.
RADS aims to detect anomalies arising due to unknown
DDoS and cryptomining attacks, traces of which are not
previously recorded. Hence, we consider that the “negative”
class samples of the attacks are not available and RADS needs
to build the classification model using the “positive” class
samples only. RADS achieves this by using the One Class
Classification (OCC) algorithm that is proposed by Hempstalk
et al. in [10]. The algorithm first generates the artificial data
(“negative” class) from a multi-variate normal distribution as
estimated from the training data (“positive” class) and, second,
uses these artificial data as a second class in the construction
13http://www.caida.org/data/passive/ddos-20070804 dataset.xml
Fig. 4: RADS overview
of a binary class classification model, which is capable of
classifying between the “positive” and the “negative” class.
The classification is based on Bayes’ Theorem14.
Figure 4 depicts an overview of RADS. RADS runs the
Model Trainer to build or train the OCC models by using
the “positive” samples, i.e. the normal CPU utilisation or the
network traffic data, which RADS collects from the hosted
VMs in a Cloud data centre. Here it is important to note
that RADS collects these training data assuming that the VMs
are not affected by any DDoS or cryptomining attack. These
training data are referred as the historical data as they are
stored for a period of time. RADS uses the Training Optimiser
to decide the optimal amount of historical data to be used
for the training of an OCC model. RADS runs the Anomaly
Detector to analyse the current data, i.e. the last one minute
of CPU utilisation or the network traffic data by using the
trained model. The model flags an anomaly whenever a VM’s
CPU or network usage pattern deviates significantly from its
“normal” pattern that is learned by the model. In both the
training and the anomaly detection, RADS uses its window-
based time series analysis as discussed in the previous section.
We explain the real-time training and anomaly detection of
RADS using a timeline as depicted in Figure 5. Specifically,
we present the timeline of 50 minutes of RADS activity while
performing training and detecting anomalies in real-time for a
specific VM. We set up the behaviour of the VM artificially
where the VM is behaving normally at all times except for
minutes 12 and 49 where the VM experiences a genuine spike
and an anomaly, respectively. For the first five minutes, RADS
remain idle in order to accumulate data points to work with.
At the end of 5th minute, RADS starts its training which runs
the training optimisation algorithm (TO) (Algorithm 1) every 5
minutes and starts its testing which runs the anomaly detection
algorithm (D) (Algorithm 2) every 1 minute. When the TO
runs for the first time (at the end of 5th minute), it performs the
training to build the OCC model for the first time. In the later
occasions, the TO evaluates the performance of the trained
model by checking whether the model is identifying the VM’s
behaviour accurately without any false positive. This checking
is performed by analysing the last five minutes of the anomaly
detection results (ADR) obtained from D. We assume that the
14http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bayes-theorem.asp
6Fig. 5: RADS real-time training and anomaly detection
Algorithm 1 Training Optimisation
input: SPT - Stability Period Threshold
output: TrainingStatus - first run/running/stopped/completed
abbreviation: ADR= AnomalyDetectionResults
1: for each VM vmi where i=1,...,N do
2: if TrainingStatusi! = “completed” then
3: if (TrainingStatusi = “ f irst run” OR ADR con-
tains “anomaly”) then
4: RUN Model Trainer
5: TrainingStatusi = “running”
6: stabilityPeriodi = 0
7: break
8: else
9: stabilityPeriodi = stabilityPeriodi+5
10: end if
11: if (stabilityPeriodi = SPT ) then
12: TrainingStatusi = “completed”
13: else
14: TrainingStatusi = “stopped”
15: end if
16: CLEAR ADR File
17: end if
18: end for
VM is anomaly-free during the runtime of TO. Therefore, if
the ADR contains “anomaly” or “A”, that means that there is
an anomaly falsely flagged by the trained model and the model
needs to be trained again; in the timeline we can see that at
the end of 15th minute the training is performed again due to
the occurrence of a false positive generated by the genuine
spike at 12th minute. If the ADR does not contain “anomaly”
or “A”, that means that the model is correctly identifying the
VM’s behaviour and the model does not need further training;
in the timeline we can see that at the end of 10th, 20th, 25th,
30th, 35th, 40th, and 45th minutes the training is stopped.
Algorithm 2 Anomaly Detection
input: CurrentData - last one minute of CPU utilisation or
network traffic data for each VM; M - set of trained OCC
models (one for each VM)
output: ADR - Anomaly Detection Result (one for each VM)
1: for each VM vmi where i=1,...,N do
2: classi f icationResulti =Mi.classi f y(CurrentDatai)
3: if (classi f icationResulti = “positive”) then
4: ADRi = “normal”
5: else
6: ADRi = “anomaly”
7: end if
8: end for
The period of time for which the model correctly iden-
tifies the “normal” behaviour, is considered as the stability
period for the model. The stability period is incremented with
each correct identification by the model (e.g. in the timeline
while moving from minute 15 to 45, the stability period is
incremented to 30 minutes). Whenever the stability period
reaches its threshold value, the TO declares that the training
is complete; in the timeline we can see that at the end of 45th
minute as we set the threshold value to 30 minutes, which
is based on the behaviour of the workloads executed in our
testbed. However, the threshold for the stability period needs
to be adjusted for different VMs based on their workload
behaviour; a Cloud data centre may do this based on the type
of the instances. Once the training is complete, RADS starts its
anomaly detection for raising anomaly alerts; in the timeline
we can see how RADS raises an anomaly alert at the 49th
minute due to the anomalous behaviour of the VM.
V. RADS FRAMEWORK
In this section we present the detailed framework of RADS.
Figure 6 depicts the framework, which is designed to be
7Fig. 6: RADS framework
implemented on each hosting node in a Cloud data centre
locally, where it can monitor all the hosted VMs in order to
detect the VM-level anomalies.
A. Data Collection
RADS uses the Data Collector module to collect the CPU
utilisation and the network traffic (total size of network packets
transmitted and received) metrics of each of the hosted VMs.
The frequency of collecting these metrics is 5 seconds which
allows capture of the CPU and network usage behaviour in
a fine-grained manner. The module runs virt-top15 (a top-like
utility for retrieving statistics of virtualised domains) on the
hosting node for collecting the VM-level metrics.
B. Window-based Time Series Analysis (WTSA) For Training
For each of the hosted VMs, the WTSA for Training first
takes all the historical raw metrics and distributes them into a
number of data bins with equal window size of 1 minute, and
second calculates the average (avg) and the standard deviation
(sd) of the metrics in each bin. Thus, from each data bin, the
module produces a vector: (avg, sd). In addition, the module
generates artificial data points which represent the genuine
workload spikes (see Section III). The number of artificial data
points is equal to the total number of raw data points, which
we have decided after evaluating the performance of RADS
with varying number of artificial data points. We represent
15http://people.redhat.com/rjones/virt-top/
Algorithm 3 Window-based Time Series Analysis (WTSA)
For Training
input: Rawhistorical - historical raw metrics of N VMs; DW -
distribution window = 1 minute
output: INNtraining - set of normalised input instances for
training; total N sets for N VMs
abbreviation: avg= Average; sd = StandardDeviation
1: for each VM vmi where i=1,...,N do
2: dataBin(DBi j) = Rawhistoricali/DW where j=1,...,B
(total number of bins)
3: inputInstances(INi) = initiate()
4: for each DBi j do
5: avg= DBi j.getAvg()
6: sd = DBi j.getSD()
7: inputInstance(in j) =
[
avg,sd
]
8: INi.addInstance(in j)
9: INi.addClassLabel(“positive”)
10: end for
11: INNtrainingi = INi.normalise()
12: for each DBi j do
13: arti f icialInstance(art j) =
[
1.0,1.0
]
14: INNtrainingi .addInstance(art j)
15: INNtrainingi .addClassLabel(“positive”)
16: end for
17: end for
18: return INNtraining
8each artificial data point as a vector: (1.0,1.0) which represents
the maximum average and the maximum standard deviation
values of the raw metrics as we consider the normalised values
of the raw metrics. The normalisation is performed by using
Equation 2. Finally, the module produces a series of vectors
for use as training data by combining the vectors which are
generated by performing the window-based processing of the
raw metrics and the vectors which are generated artificially.
We present the algorithm for this module in Algorithm 3.
C. Window-based Time Series Analysis (WTSA) For Testing
The WTSA For Testing module takes only the last one minute
of raw metrics and calculates the average (avg) and the
standard deviation (sd) of these metrics to produce the vector
(avg, sd). This vector is considered as the test sample for
detecting an anomaly. We present the algorithm for this
module in Algorithm 4. The algorithm normalises the avg and
sd values before they are combined as a vector, as defined
in Equation 2. Importantly, this normalisation is performed
against the training data, where minimum and the maximum
values are taken from the training data set. This is necessary in
order to achieve the same normalisation for both the training
and the testing data.
D. Model Training
RADS builds an OCC model for each hosted VM using the
Model Trainer module. The OCC models take the training data
samples (generated by the WTSA for Training module) as the
input and learn the “normal” CPU or network usage pattern
of the VMs. The module stores the OCC models in the Model
Storage.
E. Anomaly Detection
RADS detects the anomalies using the Anomaly Detector
module. For each VM, the module takes as input the test
sample (generated by the WTSA for Testing module) and the
stored OCC model built for that VM. The module flags an
“anomaly” when there is a deviation in the VM’s CPU or
network usage pattern.
We implemented the RADS modules using Java program-
ming, which imports Apache Common Maths16 and Weka17
libraries for performing statistical operations and One Class
Classification (OCC).
VI. EVALUATION
We performed a number of experiments to evaluate the per-
formance of RADS. The experiments can be classified into:
lab-based and real-world. The lab-based experiments were
performed in an OpenStack18 based Cloud data centre, which
hosted two representative Cloud applications drawn from the
CloudSuite19 benchmark suite. The real-world experiments
16http://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-math/
17http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
18https://www.openstack.org
19http://cloudsuite.ch
Algorithm 4 Window-based Time Series Analysis (WTSA)
For Testing
input: Rawcurrent - last one minute of raw metrics of N VMs
output: INNtesting - normalised input instances for testing;
total N instances for N VMs
abbreviation: avg= Average; sd = StandardDeviation
1: for each VM vmi where i=1,...,N do
2: inputInstances(INi) = initiate()
3: avgnormalised = Rawcurrenti .getAvg().normalise()
4: sdnormalised = Rawcurrenti .getSD().normalise()
5: if (avgnormalised > 1.0) AND (sdnormalised > 1.0) then
6: inputInstance(in) =
[
1.0,1.0
]
7: else
8: inputInstance(in) =
[
avgnormalised ,sdnormalised
]
9: end if
10: INi.addInstance(in)
11: INNtestingi = INi
12: end for
13: return INNtesting
were carried out on the real-world workload traces [7] col-
lected from a Cloud data centre named Bitbrains20. In this
section we present the results from these experiments and
discuss them. Specifically, we attempt to answer the following
research questions:
(1) Can RADS accurately detect Cloud anomalies occurring
due to DDoS and cryptomining attacks in real-time?
(2) Can RADS window-based time series analysis outperform
the state-of-the-art average and entropy based analyses in
terms of accuracy and false positive rate?
(3) Can RADS be used as a lightweight tool in terms of
consuming minimal computing resources and processing
time in a Cloud data centre?
(4) Does RADS maintain its performance in terms of re-
moving false positives while analysing real-world Cloud
workload traces?
A. Lab-based Experiments
In this section we evaluate the performance of RADS in
detecting DDoS and cryptomining attacks in our lab-based
Cloud data centre. Also, we evaluate the efficiency of RADS
in terms of the system resources that it consumes and the time
it takes while performing real-time training of the classification
models and testing of new samples to detect the anomalies.
In particular, in this section we attempt to answer research
questions 1, 2, and 3.
Testbed: Our testbed is an OpenStack based Cloud data
centre which consists of four compute nodes. Each compute
node is a Dell PowerEdge R420 server that runs CentOS 6.6
and has 24 cores, 2-way hyper-threaded, clocked at 2.20 GHz
with 12GB DRAM clocked at 1600 MHz. The nodes include
two 7.2K RPM hard drives with 1TB of SATA in RAID 0
20https://www.solvinity.com
9and a single 1GBE port. KVM is the default hypervisor of the
nodes.
Experimental Set-up: We hosted two Cloud applications
in our testbed: Graph Analytics (representing CPU inten-
sive Cloud applications) and Media Streaming (representing
network intensive Cloud applications). The experimental set-
up for the Graph Analytics is depicted in Figure 7 and the
experimental set-up for the Media Streaming is depicted in
Figure 8. The Graph Analytics application performs PageR-
ank on a Twitter dataset using the Spark21 framework. We
deployed the application on a dedicated “Analytics VM” with
the configuration: 8GB of RAM and 4 cores of CPU. Under
“normal” conditions we executed the application using only
1 core of CPU. The Media Streaming application runs a
streaming server using the Nginx22 server, which hosts videos
of various lengths and qualities. The clients send requests to
the hosted videos to create realistic media streaming behaviour.
We deployed the server on a dedicated “Server VM” with
the configuration: 4GB of RAM and 4 cores of CPU and
the clients on a dedicated “Client VM” with the same con-
figuration. In our experiment, we portrayed “normal” media
streaming behaviour by running 50 clients in the “Client VM”
with “ShortHi” configuration which requests videos with high
bandwidth of 790 Kbps.
Fig. 7: Experimental set-up for Graph Analytics application
Fig. 8: Experimental set-up for Media Streaming application
Emulated attacks: We emulated the DDoS and the crypto-
mining attacks targeting the VMs running the Media Stream-
ing server and the Graph Analytics application, respectively.
Cryptomining attack was emulated by running the “stress”23
tool on the “Analytics VM” (see Figure 7). The “stress” tool is
a simple workload generator, which can impose a configurable
amount of CPU, memory, I/O, and disk stress on the system.
The DDoS attack was emulated by sending continuous HTTP
requests from an “Attacker VM” to the “Server VM” (see
Figure 8) with the help of the iPerf24 tool (“Server VM” as
21http://spark.apache.org
22https://github.com/nginx/nginxweb
23https://people.seas.harvard.edu/a˜pw/stress/
24https://iperf.fr
iPerf server and “Attacker VM” as iPerf client).
Emulated workload spikes: For the Graph Analytics appli-
cation, a workload spike was generated by running the “stress”
tool in the “Analytics VM” for a short period of time (5
seconds). For Media Streaming application, a workload spike
was generated by sending HTTP requests for instantaneous
period of time (5 seconds) from the “Attacker VM” to the
“Sever VM” (see Figure 8) with the help of the iPerf tool
(“Server VM” as iPerf server and “Spike VM” as iPerf client).
Performance Metrics: We use a number of standard perfor-
mance metrics such as precision, recall, accuracy (F1 score),
and false positive rate (FPR) to measure the performance
of RADS. RADS reacts with an anomaly alarm whenever it
classifies a test sample as “anomalous”, otherwise RADS does
not react. In our experiments, we declare: (a) False Positives
(FP) when RADS raises an alarm but there is no “anomaly”,
(b) False Negatives (FN) when RADS fails to raise an alarm
but there exists an “anomaly”, (c) True Positives (TP) when
RADS raises an alarm and there exists an “anomaly”, (d)
True Negatives (TN) when RADS does not raise an alarm and
there is no “anomaly”. We define the performance metrics in
Equations 3-6.
Precision =
TP
TP+FP
(3)
Recall =
TP
TP+FN
(4)
Accuracy(F1score) = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(5)
FPR =
FP
FP+TN
(6)
Precision gives us the measure of how many of the positive
classifications (anomaly alarms) are correct, whereas the recall
gives us the measure of RADS’s ability to correctly identify an
“anomaly”. However, precision and recall alone cannot judge
the performance of RADS. Therefore, we use Accuracy (F1
score) which gives us the harmonic mean of precision and
recall.
Anomaly Detection Performance of RADS: To evaluate
the anomaly detection performance of RADS we carried out
two tests: (i) Attack Test - during which we emulated the DDoS
attack (targeting the VM running the Media Streaming server)
or the cryptomining attack (targeting the VM running the
Graph Analytics application) continuously for 10 minutes; and
(ii) Spike Test - during which we emulated workload spikes for
10 times in a random manner in a time period of 30 minutes;
there is no emulated attack during this test. During both the
tests, we executed the RADS Anomaly Detector module on
the hosting node. For both the tests, the module used the same
OCC models which were trained by the RADS Model Trainer
module.
Table I presents the test results under different time series
analyses. From the results we observe that the average based
analysis achieves the maximum number of true positives (total
20), but on the other hand, this approach raises the maximum
number of false positives (total 14). Entropy raises only 2
false positives in the case of the Graph Analytics VM and
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TABLE I: Anomaly detection results of RADS under different time series analyses
Monitored VM Time Series Analysis Training Time
(minutes)
Attack Test
Result
Spike Test
Result
Accuracy
(F1 Score)
False Positive
Rate (FPR)
TP FN FP TN
Graph Analytics
VM
Average
Entropy
Average & Standard Deviation
45
105
130
10 0
0 10
9 1
6 24
2 28
1 29
0.77
0.00
0.90
0.20
0.07
0.03
Media Streaming
Server VM
Average
Entropy
Average & Standard Deviation
70
20
35
10 0
10 0
9 1
8 22
0 30
0 30
0.71
1.00
0.95
0.27
0.00
0.00
no false positives in the case of the Media Streaming server
VM, but the problem with the entropy based approach is its
poor performance in detecting the attacks (10 false negatives
in the case of the Graph Analytics VM). RADS window-
based time series analysis, which uses a combination of the
average and the standard deviation, successfully detects the
attacks with total 18 true positives. We have observed that the
false negatives (1 for each of the monitored VMs) arise during
the first minute of the Attack Test, when the “anomalous”
behaviour due to attack does not occupy the whole 1 minute of
the detection window; the time series of the detection window
becomes similar to the one depicted in Figure 9. A test sample
generated from such a detection window can be represented
as: (high average, high standard deviation), which is wrongly
classified as “normal” by RADS as it considers the short-term
“anomalous” behaviour in the detection window as a genuine
workload spike. However, these false negatives are trivial
due to the fact that they appear only during the first minute
of the attack; and DDoS or cryptomining attacks require a
considerable amount of time (at least a few minutes) before
they become harmful.
Timeseries (1 minute of detection window)
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Fig. 9: The first minute of detection window which includes both the
“normal” and the “anomalous” behaviour
In order to get a better insight into the anomaly detection
performance of RADS, we calculated the accuracy (F1 score)
and the false positive rate (FPR) (see Table I) using Equations
5 and 6, respectively. These performance metrics answer the
research questions 1 and 2 as follows:
(a) RADS can detect Cloud anomalies occurring due to DDoS
and cryptomining attacks in real-time with an accuracy (F1
Score) of 90-95% and a low false positive rate of 0-3%.
(b) RADS achieves on average 34% improvement in accuracy
and 60% improvement in false positive rate while using
its window-based time series analysis instead of using the
state-of-the-art average or entropy based analysis.
Efficiency of RADS: To evaluate the efficiency of RADS
we carried out experiments while scaling up the number of
hosted VMs from 2 to 10. Although such scaling of VMs does
not represent a real Cloud data centre, we attempt to extract
some information on RADS efficiency under VM scaled up
situations.
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Fig. 10: Hosting node CPU consumption by RADS
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Fig. 11: Training and testing time required by RADS
Computation cost of RADS: We measured the computation
cost of RADS in terms of its CPU consumption on the hosting
node. The bar plots in Figure 10 show the CPU consumed by
RADS while performing the training and the testing (anomaly
detection). From the plots we find that for training, the CPU
consumption remains very low (in the range 1.6% to 2.5%) and
it does not increase much with the scaling up of the number
of VMs, whereas for testing, the CPU consumption remains
consistently negligible.
Processing time of RADS: The bar plots in Figure 11 show
the processing time that RADS took while performing the
training and the testing. From the plots we observe that RADS
took milliseconds in finishing the training and the testing tasks.
The testing time is much lower than the training time. The
training time increases with the scaling up of the number of
VMs, but the testing time remains almost constant.
In answering the research question 3, we can summarise that
RADS can be used as a lightweight tool in terms of consuming
minimal hosting node CPU and processing time in a Cloud
data centre. However, the processing time required for training
increases with the scaling up of the number of hosted VMs.
This may lead to a RADS efficiency issue in the case where
there are hundreds or thousands of hosted VMs and when the
duration of the training increases to few hours or days. In
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future, we will attempt to explore this issue and address it
with shared-memory or multithreaded programming solutions
such as OpenMP, MPI, Phoenix++, etc.
B. Real-world Experiments
In this section we evaluate the performance of RADS in
terms of false positive rate by analysing real-world Cloud
workload traces. Specifically, in this section we attempt to
answer research question 4.
Trace Description: We selected the traces collected from
a Cloud data centre named Bitbrains25 as analysed in [7].
Bitbrains specialises in managed hosting and business com-
putation for enterprises such as banks, credit card operators,
insurers, etc. The traces contain seven performance metrics
including CPU utilisation and network throughput of 1,750
VMs. The metrics are sampled every 5 minutes. The traces
were collected between July and September 2013 in two trace
directories: (i) fastStorage which consists of 1,250 VMs that
are connected to fast storage area network (SAN) storage
devices and (ii) Rnd which consists of 500 VMs that are either
connected to the fast SAN devices or to much slower Network
Attached Storage (NAS) devices. fastStorage contains one
month of trace (August, 2013), whereas Rnd contains three
months of trace (July-September, 2013).
Preparation of Traces: In order to use the traces from [7]
for evaluating the performance of RADS, we made the fol-
lowing selection process:
(1) We selected only the traces from the month August, 2013
for which both the traces (fastStorage and Rnd) were
available.
(2) We further selected the first three days of traces, making
the assumption that the Cloud applications or workloads
running inside the VMs are consistent throughout the
experimental period.
(3) Out of the three days of traces, we selected the first two
days (14:40, 12 August to 14:40, 14 August 2013) of
traces for training and and the third day (14:40, 14 August
to 14:40, 15 August 2013) of traces for testing.
(4) We performed spike detection analysis on the traces using
the Interquartile Range (IQR26) algorithm and selected
traces only from VMs which flagged spikes. This is
because we intend to evaluate the performance of RADS
in terms of dealing with the genuine workload spikes
observed in the traces.
(5) Finally, for CPU utilisation analysis, we selected traces
from VMs which have CPU utilisation greater than 10%,
and for network throughput analysis we selected the traces
from VMs with network throughput greater than 100KB/s.
This is done in order to select traces from active VMs
which are running a decent amount of workload.
Following the above selection process, we chose the traces
from 82 VMs for CPU utilisation analysis and traces from 212
VMs for network throughput analysis.
Performance of RADS Under Different Cloud Work-
loads: Out of the selected traces, we chose the traces from
25https://www.solvinity.com
26https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interquartile range
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Fig. 12: RADS analysis of different Cloud workload behaviour
observed in the traces collected from [7]: (a) VM-941 from fast-
Storage trace, (b) VM-357 from fastStorage trace, (c) VM-980
from fastStorage trace, (d) VM-306 from Rnd trace. The yellow
coloured section represents the training period and the section without
colour represents the testing period. The coloured shapes represent
“anomaly” alarms raised by RADS while using different time series
analyses: red square and black triangle are for the average and the
entropy based analysis, respectively.
a range of VMs exhibiting varying workload behaviour as
presented in Figure 12 using the time series graphs. The
time series graphs reveal how RADS performs under different
Cloud workload behaviour while using different time series
analyses. We summarise the observations from these graphs
as follows:
(a) In both cases where the workload experiences consis-
tently fluctuating behaviour (Figure 12(a)) and irregular
behaviour (Figure 12(c)), RADS successfully classifies
the genuine workload spikes as “normal” while using
its window-based time series analysis. But, while using
the average or the entropy based analysis, RADS fails
to classify the genuine workload spikes as “normal” and
raises false “anomaly” alarms.
(b) In both the cases where the workload experiences sig-
nificant genuine workload spikes (Figures 12(a) and (b))
and insignificant genuine workload spikes (Figure 12(c)),
RADS successfully classifies them as “normal” while
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using its window-based time series analysis. But, while
using the average or the entropy based analysis RADS fails
to classify them as “normal” and raises false “anomaly”
alarms.
(c) While using its window-based time series analysis, RADS
continues its successful classification of genuine workload
spikes as “normal” even when the workload experiences
genuine workload spikes during the training period (Fig-
ure 12(d)). However, using the average based analysis
RADS fails again to classify the genuine workload spikes
as “normal” and raises false “anomaly” alarm.
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Fig. 13: False Positive Rates (FPR) while running experiments on
CPU utilisation (above) and network throughput (bottom)
Overall Performance of RADS: We evaluate the overall
performance of RADS in terms of false positive rate. Figure 13
presents the results of the False Positive Rates (FPR, calculated
using Equation 6) of RADS while running the experiments on
a CPU utilisation trace of 82 VMs and a network throughput
trace of 212 VMs. The experiments were performed with 24
hours of testing trace. We summarise the observations from
the results as follows:
(a) On most occasions, when RADS uses its window-based
time series analysis (combination of average and standard
deviation), it achieves better performance (lower value of
FPR means better performance) with increase in training
time and at one stage (training time - from 36 to 48 hours)
the performance starts becoming stable. These results
emphasise further the requirement of the proposed training
optimisation algorithm (Algorithm 1), which can decide
the optimal training time.
(b) The performance of RADS while using its window-based
time series analysis is better than the performance of
RADS while using average and entropy based analysis
on most occasions.
VII. RELATED WORK
In recent years, researchers have proposed various anomaly
detection systems for Cloud data centres. We classify them
based on the machine learning algorithms which they imple-
ment.
(i) Supervised learning algorithms. Supervised learning
algorithms rely on labelled training data to detect previously
known anomalies. Li et al. [1] propose an Artificial Neural
Network (ANN) based intrusion detection system for Cloud.
The ANN algorithm learns the “normal” and the “anomalous”
behaviour from a large dataset of VM network traffic. The
learned ANN is capable of detecting Cloud security attacks
with accurate results. An anomaly detection system suitable for
the hypervisor layer is proposed in [2]. The anomaly detection
in this case is based on a mixture of Fuzzy C-Means clustering
algorithm and Artificial Neural Network (FCM-ANN) which
results in better accuracy and lower false positive rate than
the classic ANN and Naive Bayes classifier for detecting
various Cloud security attacks. The authors in [13] use Linear
Regression (LR) and Random Forest (RF) algorithms to detect
and categorise anomalies in a Cloud data centre. Gulenko et
al. [3] exploit various machine learning algorithms to detect
anomalies in Cloud host machines. They use a combination of
two types of data sets for evaluating the algorithms: “normal”
operation data and “anomalous” data obtained via anomaly
injection. They train the machine learning models offline and
use them to detect the anomalies at runtime. The supervised
learning algorithms used in Cloud anomaly detection as dis-
cussed above require training of the machine learning models
with both “normal” and “anomalous” traces. These algorithms
may fail to detect anomalies due to unknown attacks, traces of
which are not recorded by the learning models or which have
very different patterns than the learned “anomalous” patterns.
To solve this problem researchers have proposed unsupervised
learning algorithms which we discuss next. The unsupervised
learning algorithms do not require labelled training data, i.e.
they can build the learning models without the “anomalous”
traces.
(ii) Unsupervised learning algorithms. The authors in [4]
propose a mechanism for automatic anomaly detection and
root cause analysis for Cloud data centres. They use an
unsupervised K-Means clustering algorithm to identify the
“abnormal” system behaviour. UBL proposed in [5] uses an
unsupervised Self Organising Map (SOM) algorithm to predict
unknown anomalies. SOM is computationally less expensive
than K-Nearest Neighbour [14]. UBL predicts anomalies by
identifying early deviations from “normal” system behaviour.
[15] proposes a Cloud anomaly detection technique based on
the concept of data density introduced by [16], which imple-
ments non-parametric Cauchy function [17]. This technique
computes the density recursively and therefore, it is memory-
less and unsupervised. The authors in [8], [9] measure the
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entropy of the system metrics such as CPU, memory, network,
IOPS, etc., in order to identify Cloud anomalies. The entropy
values indicate the dispersal or concentration of the metric
distributions and they form the time series data for anomaly
analysis. The approach proposed in [9] identifies a Cloud se-
curity attack by observing whether the entropy variables obey
normal distribution or not. They use Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (K-S test) to identify whether the entropy variables obey
normal distribution. Recently, entropy has been used in various
network anomaly detection tools [18], [19], [20], [21]. These
tools firstly measure the entropy associated with the network
traffic or network packet features (IP addresses and ports)
and secondly they detect network attacks by observing the
variation in the entropy values. In our previous works [22],
[23] we proposed a Lightweight Anomaly Detection Tool
(LADT) which can detect anomalies on the hosting node level
by using a correlation based algorithm. The algorithm utilises
performance metrics on the hosting node level and the VM
level to track disparities on the resource usage and detect host
level attacks such as a Blue Pill attack [24]. However, this
approach is not able to detect anomalies in the VM level which
is the case for the current paper.
Although the unsupervised learning algorithms discussed
above can detect Cloud anomalies due to unknown security
attacks with high accuracy, they may generate false positives
which arise mainly due to the workload spikes in a Cloud data
centre. The authors in [6] propose a novel approach for Cloud
malware detection using one class Support Vector Machine
(SVM) algorithm. One class SVM is an extension of the
traditional two-class SVM, which was proposed by Scho¨lkopf
et al. in [25]. Similar to the OCC algorithm [10] that is used
in this paper, one class SVM takes the unlabelled training data
and produces a binary class based on the distribution of the
training data. The binary class is composed of a known class,
which is the “normal” VM behaviour and a novel class, which
is the unknown class representing the “anomalous” instances.
The work in this paper is different from that in [6] as this work
focuses more on increasing the accuracy while reducing the
false positives arising due to genuine Cloud workload spikes;
whereas, [6] focuses on reducing false positives arising due to
VM live-migration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Cloud computing services have seen significant growth in
recent years. Such growth has attracted various cybersecurity
attacks on Cloud data centres. Reports from various security
experts have raised concerns regarding the potential dam-
age and growth of the cybersecurity attacks in the Cloud.
Researchers have proposed a number of anomaly detection
techniques to deal with such attacks. However, there exists
some challenges, specifically due to the unknown behaviour
of the attacks and the occurrence of genuine Cloud workload
spikes. In this paper, we discuss these challenges and inves-
tigate the issues with the existing Cloud anomaly detection
approaches. Then, we propose a Real-time Anomaly Detection
System (RADS) which uses One Class Classification (OCC)
algorithm and a window-based time series analysis to address
the challenges.
We evaluate the performance of RADS by running lab-based
and real-world experiments. The lab-based experiments were
performed in an OpenStack based Cloud data centre, which
hosts two representative Cloud applications (Graph Analytics
and Media Streaming) collected from the CloudSuite workload
collection, whereas the real-world experiments were carried
out on the real-world workload traces collected from a Cloud
data centre named Bitbrains. Evaluation results demonstrate
that RADS can achieve 90-95% accuracy (F1 score) with a
low false positive rate of 0-3% while detecting DDoS and
cryptomining attacks in real-time. The results further reveal
that RADS experiences fewer false positives while using the
proposed window-based time series analysis than when using
state-of-the-art average or entropy based analysis. We also
evaluate the efficiency of RADS in performing the training
and the testing in real-time in our lab-based Cloud data
centre while hosting varying numbers of VMs (2-10 VMs).
The evaluation results suggest that RADS can be used as a
lightweight tool in terms of consuming minimal hosting node
CPU and processing time in a Cloud data centre. However, to
attain a more realistic evaluation of the efficiency of RADS,
we need to perform the experiment with a significantly greater
number of VMs.
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